Are we real Anal about security or what?

Military Version
a. Set the 20-character security identifier to a strong value. If unsure of the current setting, set this identifier to a new value. The security identifier is the only security mechanism built into OpenAir technology. The security identifier must be set to the same value on all access points and wireless devices. Security identifier is encoded using a proprietary algorithm during transmissions, and is difficult to compromise.

b. Disable wireless device "peer-to-peer" mode if this option is present.

c. Use Media Access Control (MAC) address authorization tables on OpenAir access points when feasible. Some OpenAir access points do not have this capability, and some may not have authorization tables large enough to cover all wireless devices in use. By using MAC address authorization, access to the wired network is restricted to specifically authorized devices. Frames with unauthorized MAC addresses are dropped by the Access Points and not passed on to the wired network. Expert attackers may be able to change their MAC address, so this mechanism is not totally secure by itself.

d. When using MAC address authorization, configure OpenAir access points to generate a Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) exception alarm message to alert system administrators when unauthorized MAC addresses are received. This will allow immediate notification of a possible attempt to "hack" into the system. When operating an OpenAir network on the outside of a security boundary (such as a firewall) do not use this configuration and do not allow SNMP traffic through the security boundary.

3. Disable DHCP for mobile devices connecting to OpenAir WLANs which are not operating behind a security boundary. Use statically assigned Internet protocol (IP) addresses and monitor IP address use to ensure that addresses are not commandeered.

4. Perform regular audits and review OpenAir WLAN logs, especially the exception alarm (SNMP) messages. Logs and audit reports provide system administrators with the current security state of the WLAN. Implement accountability procedures for configured OpenAir handheld devices. A stolen OpenAir device or network interface card may provide a means for unauthorized network access.

5. Keep the OpenAir access point and client software drivers and firmware current with the applicable Program Management Office (PMO) directives. For OpenAir networks not supported by a PMO, network operators must obtain current patches and drivers directly from the manufacturer. This ensures the most current protection for wireless systems. (Note: some access point software may revert back to default settings when updates are installed).

6. Conduct operational risk management of applications using OpenAir WLANs to ensure appropriate security measures are in place to reduce the risk to the enterprise network.

7. Discontinue the use of OpenAir network systems for any activities which do not explicitly require wireless communications. OpenAir networks should be considered high-risk unless the WLAN is engineered with encryption and access controls. Do not use unencrypted OpenAir networks to access e-mail or conduct other network operations that are typically conducted at desktop computers.

B. DISCRETIONARY ACTIONS: The following actions will further secure OpenAir networks. Implementing these actions will greatly reduce security vulnerabilities that OpenAir WLANs create in base networks. Some of these actions may become mandatory in the future and should be considered in migration plans for WLANs and new OpenAir implementations.

1. Some form of security boundary system should be placed between OpenAir access points and the internal network. The security boundary will protect the network from unauthorized access from OpenAir devices. Three architectures for a security boundary are shown below:

a. The WLAN security boundary may be provided through the existing Network Control Center (NCC) firewall.

i. A firewall may be dedicated to the WLAN network or a standard operational firewall can be modified with a third interface (or burb).

ii. WLAN access points must be connected to a network that is physically or logically isolated from the internal network. This isolated network will connect to the NCC firewall.

iii. Physical isolation may be a dedicated network using spare fiber or copper media to create point-to-point links.

iv. Logical isolation may by through the use of a dedicated Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN) or Virtual Private Networks (VPN).

v. Dedicated VLANs must be configured such that no routers are connected to them, so no data can enter or leave the VLAN without traversing the firewall.

vi. VPNs can be used to create secure tunnels from access points to the firewall through the base network. The VPN must be certified FIPS 140-1 or 140-2 compliant by the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST).

vii. Network operators and users should be cognizant that the configurations in this section do not secure wireless transmissions by themselves.

b. A centralized VPN gateway or concentrator may act as a security boundary between the WLAN and the base internal network. Wireless devices must be configured with VPN client software so that VPN tunnels are created between wireless devices and the VPN gateway, protecting wireless communications. Access points must be connected to the VPN gateway by a network that is physically or logically isolated from the base internal network (see B.1.a above). VPN should be certified FIPS 140-1 or 140-2 by NIST.

c. A data-link layer WLAN security system may be placed between access points and the base network. These systems operate much like a VPN, but work at the data-link (Ethernet) level instead of the network-layer (IP). Data-link layer WLAN security systems must be certified FIPS 140-1 or 140-2 compliant by NIST.

2. Implement an authentication system to authenticate wireless users. Authentication is necessary for accountability and to safeguard against stolen or "cloned" wireless devices. Authentication can be built into wireless applications, wireless device operating system, VPN, or a third party system. To be effective, an authentication system must restrict access to the network until the user has been authenticated.

3. Encrypt all wireless communications with NIST-certified FIPS 140-1 or 140-2 compliant cryptographic modules. Encryption may be provided by third-party software or a VPN.

4. Control the coverage area of OpenAir networks to limit WLAN access. Equip access points with directional antenna to direct coverage areas away from public or un-controlled areas. This will help minimize access to wireless transmissions by unauthorized personnel.