
Are we real Anal about security or what?
Military Version
a. Set the 20-character security identifier to a strong value.
If unsure of the current setting, set this identifier to a new value. The
security identifier is the only security mechanism built into OpenAir
technology. The security identifier must be set to the same value on all access
points and wireless devices. Security identifier is encoded using a proprietary
algorithm during transmissions, and is difficult to compromise.
b. Disable wireless device "peer-to-peer" mode if this option
is present.
c. Use Media Access Control (MAC) address
authorization tables on OpenAir access points when feasible. Some OpenAir
access points do not have this capability, and some may not have authorization
tables large enough to cover all wireless devices in use. By using MAC address
authorization, access to the wired network is restricted to specifically
authorized devices. Frames with unauthorized MAC addresses are dropped by the
Access Points and not passed on to the wired network. Expert attackers may be
able to change their MAC address, so this mechanism is not totally secure by
itself.
d. When using MAC address authorization,
configure OpenAir access points to generate a Simple Network Management
Protocol (SNMP) exception alarm message to alert system administrators when
unauthorized MAC addresses are received. This will allow immediate notification
of a possible attempt to "hack" into the system. When operating an OpenAir
network on the outside of a security boundary (such as a firewall) do not use
this configuration and do not allow SNMP traffic through the security
boundary.
3. Disable DHCP for mobile devices
connecting to OpenAir WLANs which are not operating behind a security boundary.
Use statically assigned Internet protocol (IP) addresses and monitor IP address
use to ensure that addresses are not commandeered.
4.
Perform regular audits and review OpenAir WLAN logs, especially the exception
alarm (SNMP) messages. Logs and audit reports provide system administrators
with the current security state of the WLAN. Implement accountability
procedures for configured OpenAir handheld devices. A stolen OpenAir device or
network interface card may provide a means for unauthorized network access.
5. Keep the OpenAir access point and client software
drivers and firmware current with the applicable Program Management Office
(PMO) directives. For OpenAir networks not supported by a PMO, network
operators must obtain current patches and drivers directly from the
manufacturer. This ensures the most current protection for wireless systems.
(Note: some access point software may revert back to default settings when
updates are installed).
6. Conduct operational risk
management of applications using OpenAir WLANs to ensure appropriate security
measures are in place to reduce the risk to the enterprise network.
7. Discontinue the use of OpenAir network systems for any
activities which do not explicitly require wireless communications. OpenAir
networks should be considered high-risk unless the WLAN is engineered with
encryption and access controls. Do not use unencrypted OpenAir networks to
access e-mail or conduct other network operations that are typically conducted
at desktop computers.
B. DISCRETIONARY ACTIONS: The
following actions will further secure OpenAir networks. Implementing these
actions will greatly reduce security vulnerabilities that OpenAir WLANs create
in base networks. Some of these actions may become mandatory in the future and
should be considered in migration plans for WLANs and new OpenAir
implementations.
1. Some form of security boundary
system should be placed between OpenAir access points and the internal network.
The security boundary will protect the network from unauthorized access from
OpenAir devices. Three architectures for a security boundary are shown below:
a. The WLAN security boundary may be provided
through the existing Network Control Center (NCC) firewall.
i. A firewall may be dedicated to the WLAN network or a
standard operational firewall can be modified with a third interface (or
burb).
ii. WLAN access points must be connected to a
network that is physically or logically isolated from the internal network.
This isolated network will connect to the NCC firewall.
iii. Physical isolation may be a dedicated network using spare
fiber or copper media to create point-to-point links.
iv. Logical isolation may by through the use of a dedicated
Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN) or Virtual Private Networks (VPN).
v. Dedicated VLANs must be configured such that no routers are
connected to them, so no data can enter or leave the VLAN without traversing
the firewall.
vi. VPNs can be used to create secure
tunnels from access points to the firewall through the base network. The VPN
must be certified FIPS 140-1 or 140-2 compliant by the National Institute for
Standards and Technology (NIST).
vii. Network
operators and users should be cognizant that the configurations in this section
do not secure wireless transmissions by themselves.
b. A centralized VPN gateway or concentrator may act as a
security boundary between the WLAN and the base internal network. Wireless
devices must be configured with VPN client software so that VPN tunnels are
created between wireless devices and the VPN gateway, protecting wireless
communications. Access points must be connected to the VPN gateway by a network
that is physically or logically isolated from the base internal network (see
B.1.a above). VPN should be certified FIPS 140-1 or 140-2 by NIST.
c. A data-link layer WLAN security system may be placed
between access points and the base network. These systems operate much like a
VPN, but work at the data-link (Ethernet) level instead of the network-layer
(IP). Data-link layer WLAN security systems must be certified FIPS 140-1 or
140-2 compliant by NIST.
2. Implement an
authentication system to authenticate wireless users. Authentication is
necessary for accountability and to safeguard against stolen or "cloned"
wireless devices. Authentication can be built into wireless applications,
wireless device operating system, VPN, or a third party system. To be
effective, an authentication system must restrict access to the network until
the user has been authenticated.
3. Encrypt all
wireless communications with NIST-certified FIPS 140-1 or 140-2 compliant
cryptographic modules. Encryption may be provided by third-party software or a
VPN.
4. Control the coverage area of OpenAir networks
to limit WLAN access. Equip access points with directional antenna to direct
coverage areas away from public or un-controlled areas. This will help minimize
access to wireless transmissions by unauthorized personnel.